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Abstract - In a series of recent papers professor Mark Blaug accuses the Formalist Revolution of 
the 1950s of having greatly damaged economic science by burying the conception of ‘competition 
as a process’ in favour of a conception of ‘competition as an end-state’, incompatible with realistic 
studies of stability. The paper argues that the criticism is convincing and in fact addressed at the 
Arrow-Debreu conception of equilibrium, which is a very-short-period conception due to the 
Walrasian treatment of the capital endowment. Given the unreality of the resulting model, which 
assumes complete futures markets and can study stability only under the auctioneer, the question 
arises of why the Arrow-Debreu model and its conception of equilibrium were so successful, given 
that traditionally the dominant conception of equilibrium had been a long-period one (even in 
Walras: new evidence is adduced in support of this last thesis). The answer is found in the problems 
of neoclassical capital theory. The conclusion is that professor Blaug’s criticisms point to a 
necessity to return to the long-period method, but this requires abandoning the marginalist or 
supply-and-demand approach to value and distribution, because it was precisely the inability of the 
latter approach satisfactorily to determine long-period positions that motivated the switch to the 
sterile modern versions of general equilibrium. 
 










I. Introduction. Professor Blaug has a point, but this raises a 
question. 
 
1. In a series of stimulating papers professor Mark Blaug (1997, 1999, 
1999b, 2002, 2002b, 2003, 2003b) has accused modern economics of having 
undergone a “formalist revolution” with very negative consequences on its 
scientific fruitfulness: 
 
The metamorphosis of economics in the late 1940s and 1950s is aptly called 
a “formalist revolution” because it was marked, not just by a preference, but 
by an absolute preference for the form of an economic argument over its 
contents. (Blaug 2003: 145) 
 
...modern economics is sick; economics has increasingly become an 
intellectual game played for its own sake and not for its practical 
consequences; economists have gradually converted the subject into a sort 
of Social Mathematics in which analytical rigor as understood in math 
departments is everything and empirical relevance (as understood in physics 
departments) is nothing… To paraphrase the title of a popular British 
musical: “No Reality, Please. We’re Economists”. (Blaug 2002: 36) 
 
The present paper contends that professor Blaug’s criticism points at 
very important problems and sets us on the right track in the search for the 
roots of these problems; the result of this search – which brings us to 
reconsider Walras too – is a very useful perspective on the state of economic 
theory, and a proposal on how to surmount the deficiencies of modern value 
theory.  
The reason why professor Blaug gives great importance to the 
‘formalist revolution’ is partly because it causes a waste of intellectual 
energies, channeling them too much into showing an ability to manipulate 
mathematical models[1], but above all because he considers it responsible for 
the sterility of modern value theory, i.e. of modern general equilibrium 
theory. The ‘sickness’ of which he accuses modern economics is essentially a 
_______________ 
1 This point is developed mainly in Blaug (2002: 35-6), but not particularly 
insisted upon elsewhere.                                                                    .    2     
sickness of general equilibrium theory, and it consists of having expunged 
from economic theory the study of ‘competition as a process’, in favour of an 
exclusive concentration on ‘competition as an end-state’:  
 
The Formalist Revolution made the existence and determinacy of 
equilibrium the be all and end all of economic analysis ... What is little 
understood about the Formalist Revolution of the 1950’s is precisely that 
the process-conception of equilibrium was so effectively buried in that 
period that what is now called neoclassical orthodoxy, mainstream 
economics, consists entirely of static end-state equilibrium theorizing with 
little attention to the stability of equilibrium (Blaug 2003: 146) 
 
In short, what is missing in GE theory and hence in Neowalrasian 
microeconomics is, quite simply, competitive rivalry between transactors in 
actual markets. (2003b: 401) 
 
The result, Blaug accuses, is that modern microeconomics obscures the 
way competition actually works, i.e. through rivalry and 
Schumpeterian/Marxian continuous innovation. The same disregard for the 
dynamical processes of actual choice characterizes the game-theoretic notion 
of Nash equilibrium, Blaug notices; but he makes it clear that the 
developments in general equilibrium theory were more important, cf. 
especially Blaug (2003: 149-50). The real target of his criticism is crystal 
clear in the final sentence of one article: “The best way not to learn how 
markets function and how a competitive economy actually works is to study 
general equilibrium theory” (Blaug 2003: 154). 
  According to professor Blaug a special role in the spread of the 
Formalist Revolution must be attributed to the Arrow-Debreu famous 1954 
article: 
 
the centerpiece [of the publications of the 1950s embodying the Formalist 
Revolution] is (surely?) the Arrow-Debreu proof of the existence of general 
equilibrium. It neatly exhibits the worst features of formalism, which is not 
just the application of mathematical techniques to economics, but rather 
reveling in mathematical modeling as an end in itself (Blaug 2003: 146) 
 
If we can date the onset of the illness at all, it is the publication in 1954 of a 
famous paper by ... Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu; it is this paper that 
marks the beginning of what has since become a cancerous growth in the 
very center of microeconomics. (Blaug 2002: 36)                                                                    .    3     
 
Why can the 1954 paper by Arrow and Debreu on existence of general 
equilibrium be accused of having started “a cancerous growth in the very 
center of microeconomics”, i.e. a growth of papers more interested in showing 
mathematical prowess than in furthering the understanding of economic 
reality? Because based on  
 
assumptions which clearly violated economic reality; for example, that 
there are forward markets for every commodity and for all conceivable 
contingencies in all future periods... Even so, Arrow and Debreu did not 
manage to prove that such a general equilibrium is stable in the sense that it 
is actually attained from whatever position at which we start... 
Unfortunately, this paper soon became a model of what economists ought to 
aim for as modern scientists. In the process, few readers realized that Arrow 
and Debreu had in fact abandoned the vision that had originally motivated 
Walras. For Walras, general equilibrium theory was intended to be an 
abstract but nevertheless realistic description of the functioning of a 
capitalist economy and he was therefore more concerned to show that 
markets will clear automatically via price adjustments in response to 
positive or negative excess demands – a property which he labelled 
"tâtonnement" – than to prove that an [sic] unique set of prices and 
quantities is capable of clearing all markets simultaneously. By the time we 
get to Arrow and Debreu, however, general equilibrium theory has ceased 
to make any descriptive claim about actual economic systems and has 
become a purely formal apparatus about a virtual economy... blatantly and 
even scandalously unrepresentative of any recognizable economic system. 
(Blaug 2002: 36-7) 
 
It is not easy to reject the claim that a model that assumes complete 
futures markets is “unrepresentative of any recognizable economic system”. 
Professor Blaug is, indeed, in excellent company in finding that there is 
something basically wrong with modern general equilibrium theory. Strong 
dissatisfaction with that theory was expressed by one of its most highly 
esteemed practitioners already in 1981:  
 
I have always regarded Competitive General Equilibrium analysis as 
akin to the mock-up an aircraft engineer might build....theorists all over the 
world have become aware that anything based on this mock-up is unlikely 
to fly, since it neglects some crucial aspects of the world, the recognition of 
which will force some drastic re-designing. Moreover, at no stage was the                                                                    .    4     
mock-up complete; in particular, it provided no account of the actual 
working of the invisible hand. (Hahn 1981: 1036) 
 
Has the situation changed in more recent years? It would seem not. A 
number of respected specialists have kept expressing serious reservations on 
the usefulness of general equilibrium theory. For example:  
 
...we are at a turning point in economic theory. Much of the elegant 
theoretical structure that has been constructed over the last one hundred 
years in economics will be seen over the next decade to have provided a 
wrong focus and a misleading and ephemeral idea of what constitutes an 
equilibrium. (Kirman 1999: 8)  
 
Out of many other possible references expressing similar misgivings, I 
would like to remember three which are possibly less well known, Shubik 
(1993), Fisher (2003: 91) and Howitt (1996: 76)[2].  
The further claim implicitly advanced by Blaug, that the unreality of 
the assumptions of the Arrow-Debreu paper significantly helped the rise of a 
formalistic style too little concerned with the empirical relevance of the 
assumptions made, again has considerable plausibility. Once a model based 
on highly questionable assumptions becomes praised by the profession, then 
other economists feel authorized to do the same, and journals feel authorized 
to accept their papers. Thus, for example, the assumption of complete futures 
markets (or perfect foresight) has been extended to an infinity of future 
periods in the study of intertemporal general equilibrium over the infinite 
future: an extension not without motivations, given the illegitimacy of 
postulating that the economy ends after a finite number of periods; but so 
absurd an extension (what about the tastes of consumers yet to be born? or 
future technical progress?), that it should have induced economists to ask 
_______________ 
2 The issue has also attracted the attention of methodologists. In 1989, in a 
contribution in the Journal of Economic Perspectives meant to give a general 
picture of the field of economic methodology, Daniel Hausman, after expressing 
some skepticism at the traditional central concern of methodologists − theory 
appraisal −, proceeded to list some issues on which, he suggested, the energies of 
methodologists might be more usefully employed. The first one was: “The role and 
significance of general equilibrium theory are still not entirely clear” (Hausman 
1989: 51). Food for thought, isn’t it: after decades of centrality in research and 
teaching, the recognized foundation of the dominant theory of value and distribution 
was found of still unclear role and significance by a scholar with excellent 
credentials for the role of impartial observer.                                                                    .    5     
where the wrong choice had been made, whose inner logic obliged the 
theorist to make such an extreme assumption. 
But if professor Blaug appears to have a point with both his claims 
relative to the Arrow-Debreu model, then an important question is thereby 
raised: what is it that induced Arrow and Debreu to propose, and the 
economic profession to accept, so patently unrealistic a model as the Arrow-
Debreu intertemporal general equilibrium model as the foundation of the 
theory of value and distribution? Surely the answer, if a convincing answer 
can be found, will also help explain how general equilibrium theory can 
maintain its privileged place in textbooks as the rigorous formulation of the 
theory of competitive value and distribution, when so many doubts are 
expressed about its validity.  
Professor Blaug does not supply a clear answer. In one article he 
suggests an influence of Bourbakism, the French project of recasting the 
whole of mathematics as deductions from axioms (Blaug 2003: 148, 150). But 
such an influence can perhaps explain Debreu’s style, not the proposal of the 
conception of general equilibrium as an intertemporal complete-markets 
equilibrium, nor the success of that conception with the majority of the 
profession (anyway surely little touched by those tendencies in pure 
mathematics). In an earlier article, after explicitly posing the question of why 
the Formalist Revolution happened, Blaug had suggested a sociological 
explanation: 
  
As mathematics became the order of the day, the Young Turks found 
mathematics a perfect tool to disenfranchise the older generation and in a 
rapidly growing system of higher education after World War II some such 
device was useful as a way of gaining an edge over one’s rivals in the 
academic market-place...the trigger for the entire process is nevertheless the 
steady growth of mathematical skills increasingly perceived as the entry 
ticket to an academic career. (Blaug 1999b: 276) 
 
Considerations of this type can contribute to explain why mathematical 
competence became more and more important to the point, probably, of 
overestimation, but they cannot explain why the Arrow-Debreu conception of 
general equilibrium as an intertemporal complete-markets equilibrium was 
accepted: the acceptance of that notion of equilibrium (as distinct from 
admiration for the mathematical feat of the existence proof)[3] did not require 
_______________ 
3 Once a problem requiring advanced mathematics for its solution is shown to 
have economic relevance, the use of advanced mathematics for its study cannot be                                                                    .    6     
high mathematics, as we can clearly see now that this notion of equilibrium is 
explained in second-year textbooks using no maths beyond elementary 
calculus. And since “When Arrow and Debreu employed game theory and the 
Nash equilibrium to prove existence of general equilibrium in the 1950s, the 
Formalist Revolution was still in its early stages” (Blaug 2003: 149-50), 
economic theorists could not be at the time already so deformed by formalism 
as to be ready to accept nearly anything as long as it was mathematically 
elegant.   
Supplying a more satisfactory answer is the central purpose of the 
present paper.  
The essential clue, I will argue, lies in the problems of neoclassical 
capital theory. The present paper intends to show that the reconstruction, 
started by Garegnani (1960, 1962, 1976, 1990) and then integrated by several 
other authors (e.g. Milgate (1982), Petri (1991, 2004)), of how these capital-
theoretic problems have conditioned the development of neoclassical theory, 
supplies the needed answer. This answer has implications that extend beyond 
issues of historical reconstruction: it yields indications, that will be briefly 
pointed out at the end of the paper, on how to surmount the deficiencies of the 
Arrow-Debreu model that professor Blaug insists upon. 
___________________________________________________ 
criticised. And it is only normal that mastery of powerful mathematical tools at the 
level of good mathematicians should earn respect. Trouble only starts when these 
tools are wasted on irrelevant problems and the waste is not recognized as such. But 
assessment of a line of inquiry as relevant or wasteful is a theoretical issue, that 
normally, in economics, does not require the mastery of very advanced 
mathematics. Thus I would suggest that, in economics, employment of vast 
mathematical energies in a field only persists if economic theorists consider the 
field important. This is not to deny that there may be systemic reasons inducing 
economists to prefer problems requiring a high mathematical formalization, with a 
danger of misallocation of scientific effort: for example the greater comfort, and 
smaller cost, of doing armchair theorizing relative to collecting and processing 
historical and statistical information; the barriers to understanding and criticism 
introduced by the use of more and more advanced mathematics that only very few 
people can follow; the greater ease of ascertaining ‘technical competence’ (mastery 
of tools) rather than capacity to understand reality, in candidates to academic posts; 
and perhaps also the greater distance from the frequent ugliness of brutal facts, 
whose unprejudiced study might sometimes create problems to one’s conscience, if 
not to one’s career (let us remember what happened to the Israeli historian Pappe). 
These issues, important as they are, and largely amenable to analysis with the 
economist’s tools (one example is Pagano 2002), fall however outside the scope of 
the present paper, which is not centrally concerned with the reasons for the 
mathematization of economics, but rather with the reasons for the success of the 
Arrow-Debreu model.                                                                    .    7     
 
2. It is professor Blaug himself who brings us to issues discussed in 
recent debates on neoclassical capital theory. He particularly stresses two 
negative aspects of the Arrow-Debreu approach to general equilibrium: first, 
that it needs an assumption of complete futures markets; second, that it gives 
up any attempt to prove that the equilibrium is stable, and concentrates 
exclusively on existence. This second criticism, when well understood, is a 
useful entrance key to the question. Blaug accuses Arrow-Debreu of having 
abandoned Walras' attempt “to show that markets will clear automatically via 
price adjustments in response to positive or negative excess demands” (Blaug 
2002: 37). But Arrow, shortly after the article with Debreu, co-authored with 
Hurwicz and Block two articles on the stability of equilibrium. So what Blaug 
must mean is that the modern studies of the stability of Arrow-Debreu 
equilibria do not really ask the same question Walras was asking. And why 
so? Because the studies of the stability of Arrow-Debreu equilibria, based as 
they are on a fairy-tale tâtonnement in a 'suspended activity' situation in 
which no exchanges nor production nor consumption are permitted until an 
equilibrium is reached, cannot pretend to describe, in Hahn’s words, “the 
actual working of the invisible hand” and therefore cannot be considered 
studies of the stability of actual market processes[4]. But then even if it could 
be shown to be tâtonnement-stable, an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium would still 
offer no guarantee of being a situation toward which “the actual working of 
the invisible hand” pushes a market economy, even leaving aside the 
continuous innovation brought about by rivalrous Schumpeterian/Marxian 
competition. Thus Blaug can conclude that Arrow and Debreu have “ceased 
to make any descriptive claim about actual economic systems”. However, on 
this issue of the study of stability, at least the Walras of the last two editions 
of the Eléments, where the tâtonnement is based on the new device of 'bons' 
and therefore excludes the implementation of disequilibrium productions (in 
the first three editions the tâtonnement involved actual disequilibrium 
productions and sales of factor services), is as liable as Arrow and Debreu to 
such a charge[5]. 
_______________ 
4 That this is what actually Blaug means emerges when he writes (2002: 40) that 
"general equilibrium theory solved the stability-of-equilibrium question by ruling 
out disequilibrium trading"; cf. also the next footnote.  
5 Blaug (2002b: 24-25) knows it well, and in (2002: fn. 4, p. 51) he confirms that 
he views the studies of stability through the tâtonnement based on ‘bons’ as not 
concerned with real stability, by writing that the later Walras shifted his focus from 
the stability problem to the existence question, and citing in support Walker (1997), 
and elsewhere Walker (1996), evidently interpreting Walker’s criticism of the                                                                    .    8     
One is then induced to ask, is there any analytical element common to 
the later Walras, and to Arrow-Debreu, that may explain the peculiar absence 
of realism of their analyses of stability? And might not the same element be 
also responsible for the other obvious absence of realism of the Arrow-
Debreu model, the complete intertemporal markets assumption? If such an 
element can be found, then the explanation of the success of the Arrow-
Debreu model will have to look for the causes of the acceptance of this 
element, in spite of the lack of realism it engendered. 
 
3. The common analytical element we are looking for can indeed be 
found: it has been pointed out by Pierangelo Garegnani (1976, 1990) and 
insisted upon in Petri (1991, 2004). It is the treatment of the equilibrium's 
endowment of capital goods as a given vector, in other words, the inclusion in 
the equilibrium's data of a given endowment for each capital good. 
The founders other than Walras of the marginalist[6] approach to 
income distribution had on the contrary treated capital as a single quantity of 
variable 'form' (composition), crystallised at any moment in a certain vector 
of heterogeneous capital goods but capable of changing ‘form’ without 
changing in ‘quantity’ through the utilization of the resources, which might 
reproduce the worn-out capital goods, for the production of different capital 
goods. When writing down (in equations or in words) the conditions 
determining the general equilibrium with capital goods, Jevons, J. B. Clark, 
Böhm-Bawerk, Wicksell all took as given the quantity of capital, a single 
number, and left its ‘form’ (i.e. its composition, and hence the endowments of 
the several capital goods) to be determined endogenously by the long-period 
condition of a uniform rate of return on the supply price of capital goods[7].  
The difference this makes to the study of the stability of equilibrium is 
evident. Traditional marginalist authors, by conceiving capital as a single 
factor whose 'quantity' was only altered by net accumulation, not by changes 
in its 'form', could treat its endowment as given with the same legitimacy as 
for the endowments of (the several types of) labour or land, and could 
therefore allow for time-consuming disequilibrium adjustments including 
production and exchanges; these adjustments would adapt the ‘form’ of 
capital so as to reach a uniform rate of return on supply price, while in the 
___________________________________________________ 
unreality of the tâtonnement based on ‘bons’ (cf. e.g. Walker 1997: 116), as 
meaning an accusation that Walras had actually given up on stability. 
6 ‘Marginalist’ is used in this paper as synonymous with ‘neoclassical’.  
7 For Marshall, who shied away from an explicit formulation of the complete 
system of equations of the general equilibrium with capital goods, cf. Garegnani 
(1978).                                                                     .    9     
meanwhile net savings would only marginally affect the total ‘quantity’ of 
capital which could therefore be treated as given. (The speed of variation of 
the endowment of capital so conceived could indeed be argued to be of the 
same order of magnitude as the speed of variation of population, or of the 
supplies of the several types of labour[8]: i.e. much slower than the speed of 
variation of the composition or ‘form’ of capital; this difference in relative 
speed rendered it legitimate to assume that the ‘form’ of capital was 
endogenously determined while treating its total endowment as given.) If, to 
the contrary, the data of equilibrium include given endowments of each 
capital good, then stability can only be studied on the basis of processes that 
do not cause changes in those data, and therefore on the basis of ultra-fast 
adjustments with recontracting, based on 'bons' or analogous fairy tales that 
exclude production during the adjustment. 
The connection with the assumption of complete futures markets is also 
easily grasped. When the initial composition of capital is given, one can no 
longer assume, as on the contrary is possible in long-period analyses, that 
endogenous changes in equilibrium relative prices are slow enough as to 
make it legitimate to neglect them. The arbitrary given initial endowments of 
capital goods may be very far from what firms wish to have at their disposal, 
so they may be quickly changing with consequent relevant changes in relative 
prices. It becomes therefore necessary, in determining the actions of agents at 
the time the equilibrium is established, to take into account the changes that 
relative prices are undergoing. This can be done either by assuming the 
simultaneous determination of equilibrium current and subsequent prices 
(intertemporal equilibria), or by introducing expectations of price changes and 
determining temporary equilibria with expectation functions among the data. 
The complete futures markets assumption is the necessary way to take into 
account the relevant non-constancy of relative prices in these very-short-
period equilibria, when one does not wish to consider temporary general 
equilibria with their problems deriving from subjective unobservable and non-
uniform expectations. 
 
4. The question to be answered is then, why did the Walras-Arrow-
Debreu treatment of the capital endowment as a given vector finally come to 
_______________ 
8 Precisely because of the slowness with which they can be assumed to change, 
the endowments of the different types of labour could each be treated as given in the 
determination of a long-period equilibrium, and therefore, contrary to a frequent 
misunderstanding, the need for 'aggregation' which, in long-period equilibria, arises 
for capital does not arise for labour, cf. Petri (1999: 45-6).                                                                    .    10     
be preferred to the originally dominant treatment of capital as a single factor 
of endogenously determined ‘form’?  
A satisfactory answer must first explain why the Walrasian treatment of 
the capital endowment remained for many decades minoritarian. The reason, 
it will be argued, is that, at least until the 1940s, adherence to the traditional 
long-period method prevailed; as the next section points out, Walras was no 
exception, and was simply contradictory because his treatment of the capital 
endowment was incompatible with that method (Garegnani 1962, 1990); it is 
then not surprising that his treatment of the capital endowment could only 
become widespread when the basis of the neoclassical theory of value and 
distribution shifted to very-short-period equilibria.  Section 3 goes on to 
explain why this shift occurred; Section 4 shows that the shift was 
accompanied by confusion and uncertainty; Section 5 pulls together the 
argument and enunciates the answer to the question why Arrow-Debreu was 
so successful; Section 6 briefly discusses the implications of this answer for 
the best way forward for value theory. 
 
II. Walras as a long-period theorist. 
 
5. The distinction between long-period and very-short-period notions of 
price and of equilibrium is fundamental, and can help bring clarity to the 
debates on the interpretation of Walras too. Walras, no less than the other 
founders of the marginalist approach, aimed at determining prices yielding a 
uniform rate of return on supply price: the prices called natural prices by 
Adam Smith, prices of production by Marx, long-period normal prices by 
Marshall, and simply equilibrium prices by Wicksell. 
This notion of long-period price is of course what students are 
introduced to in any economics textbook, in the chapter illustrating the 
partial-equilibrium analysis of the tendency (in competitive conditions with 
free entry) of the short-period price of a product toward the long-period price 
corresponding to zero 'pure profits', owing to changes in the number and/or 
dimension of firms in the industry(9). In these analyses the long-period price 
_______________ 
9 Zero 'profits', in the marginalist sense of what is left of revenue after paying all 
costs including interest (gross of a risk allowance) on the capital employed. The 
Classical authors did not include interest among the costs to be subtracted from 
revenue in order to obtain profits, so that the term 'profits' has a different meaning: 
the tendency to zero 'profits' in the marginalist sense is expressed by the Classical 
authors as the tendency of profits to become the normal ones i.e. to guarantee the 
normal 'rate of profits' (the same rate of return on the capital employed as in other 
industries - once account is taken of risk).                                                                    .    11     
of a good, i.e. its minimum average cost, is determined on the basis of given 
input prices. But the moment capital goods are admitted among the inputs of 
the good in question, the same tendency must be admitted to be 
simultaneously at work for their prices, and (by altering their quantities) to be 
influencing the rentals to be paid for their use and thus the average cost of the 
good in question; so, a consistent determination of the long-period price of a 
product requires the simultaneous determination of the long-period prices and 
rentals of all capital goods directly or indirectly entering its production, i.e. 
the determination of the uniform-rate-of-return-on-supply-price (URRSP) 
relative prices I have been speaking of.  
Adam Smith, Ricardo, Jevons, Marshall, Wicksell, Robertson, J. B. 
Clark, in spite of profound differences in the theory of income distribution 
and employment, did not differ on the central role of these long-period prices. 
These were the prices that analysis had to determine in order to be able to 
explain and predict the trend of the average day-by-day market price of a 
product. 
Thus marginalist authors like Marshall, Robertson, Wicksell or J. B. 
Clark took it for granted – just like Smith, Ricardo, or Marx – that it is not 
only uninteresting, but also impossible, fully to describe the forces 
determining the details of each single transaction, or production decision; but 
they shared with the classical authors the belief that it was possible to explain 
and predict the average of each price or quantity, because the actual path of a 
price or of a quantity, although unpredictable in its details, would tend to 
gravitate around and towards definite values or "centres of gravitation", 
independent of the details of the gravitational process itself. The existence of 
this gravitation made the prediction of each single transaction unnecessary 
(and uninteresting). Changes of this "centre of gravitation", caused by 
changes in the data determining it, could then be used to explain and predict 
the  trend of the actual path of the variable under consideration, a trend 
determined by the tendency to gravitate toward the new (or the shifting) 
centre of gravitation. The differences between the classical and the 
marginalist theories of distribution entailed that the centres of gravitation 
were determined differently in the two approaches, but the distinction 
between market and normal magnitudes, the latter being the centres of 
gravitation of the former, is found in both groups of theories[10]. 
_______________ 
10 Marshall had a more articulated analysis and thought that one could also 
conceive, in certain cases, of more short-period centres of gravitation of market 
prices in partial-equilibrium analyses (although in those cases his analysis did not 
reach the definiteness of results achievable in long-period analysis, cf. Ciccone,                                                                    .    12     
 
6. So the role traditionally assigned to equilibria by marginalist authors 
was the very concrete and relevant one of determining the average or trend of 
the observed prices and quantities of economies admitted to be continually in 
disequilibrium[11]. Walras is no different in this respect: 
 
It never happens in the real world that the selling price of any given 
product is absolutely equal to the cost of the productive services that enter 
into that product, or that the effective demand and supply of services or 
products are absolutely equal. Yet equilibrium is the normal state, in the 
sense that it is the state towards which things spontaneously tend under a 
régime of free competition in exchange and in production. (Walras 1954: 
224-5) 
 
Such is the continuous market, which is perpetually tending towards 
equilibrium without ever actually attaining it, because the market has no 
other way of approaching equilibrium except by groping, and, before the 
goal is reached, it has to renew its efforts and start over again, all the basic 
data of the problem, e.g. the initial quantities possessed, the utilities of 
goods and services, the technical coefficients, the excess of income over 
consumption, the working capital requirements, etc., having changed in the 
meantime. Viewed in this way, the market is like a lake agitated by the 
wind, where the water is incessantly seeking its level without ever reaching 
it. But whereas there are days when the surface of a lake is almost smooth, 
there never is a day when the effective demand for products and services 
equals their effective supply and when the selling price of products equals 
the cost of the productive services used in making them. The diversion of 
productive services from enterprises that are losing money to profitable 
enterprises takes place in various ways, the most important being through 
credit operations, but at best these ways are slow. (ibid., p. 380, emphasis 
added) 
 
These passages are present from the first to the last edition of Walras' 
Eléments.  
___________________________________________________ 
1999). But the variables impounded in the ceteris-paribus conditions in those 
analyses, and especially the distributive variables, were not based on short-period 
equilibration between supply and demand, but rather on long-period forces. 
11 For some examples of application of the long-period method, cf. Petri (2004: 
ch. 1).                                                                    .    13     
An important implication of these admissions is the following. If one 
wants to determine the "centre of gravitation" of time-consuming adjustment 
processes for an economy with produced means of production (capital goods), 
then the need to conceive these processes as taking time and involving the 
implementation of out-of-equilibrium decisions makes it impossible to include 
a given quantity of each capital good among the data determining the "centre 
of gravitation", because disequilibrium processes can and will quickly alter 
these quantities, which must therefore be conceived as determined by, rather 
than determining, the ‘centre of gravitation’[12]. As a consequence, the 
positions qualifying as "centres of gravitation" in a general equilibrium 
analysis must be such that the relative amounts of the several capital goods in 
existence have themselves reached an equilibrium and are therefore 
endogenously determined by the equilibrium itself. In those marginalist 
authors who recognized this logical necessity of their analysis, the force 
which would tend to adjust the stocks of capital goods to the demands for 
them was the same as in the classical authors: the ‘mobility of capitals’ in the 
search for the highest rate of return, i.e. the tendency of investments to be 
directed to the purchase prevalently of the capital goods offering the prospect 
of a higher rate of return – the same process which was seen as responsible 
for the tendency of rates of return on supply price toward uniformity.  
Here too Walras is no different; he too writes that in equilibrium this 
process must have completed its operations: 
 
Capital goods proper … are products and their prices are subject to the 
law of cost of production. If their selling price is greater than their cost of 
production, the quantity produced will increase and their selling price will 
fall; if their selling price is lower than their cost of production the quantity 
produced will diminish and their selling price will rise. In equilibrium their 
selling price and their cost of production are equal. (Walras 1954: 271; 
unchanged from the second to the last edition of the Eléments). 
 
Consistently with this quotation, in his general equilibrium equations 
Walras assumes the equality between cost of production and “selling price” 
(his term for demand price, the present value of the future rentals to be earned 
by the capital good), i.e. he assumes the uniformity of the rate of return on 
supply price for all capital goods. This is the distinctive mark of long-period 
analysis. The above quotation furthermore admits that it is changes in the 
_______________ 
12 The very durable produced means of production (e.g. dams), once built, are 
more appropriately seen as analogous to natural resources.                                                                    .    14     
relative endowments of the several capital goods that bring this equality 
about: the reason why an increase in “the quantity produced” brings about a 
lower “selling price” for a capital good can only be the decreased scarcity of 
that capital good, brought about by the increase in its endowment. Again, this 
is fully traditional. But then he, like e.g. Wicksell, should have treated the 
relative endowments of the several capital goods as variables, that adapt so as 
to guarantee, for all capital goods, the equality between cost of production and 
capitalized value of future rentals. On the contrary, he takes the endowments 
of the several capital goods as given. 
 
7. The explanation would appear to be that he did not initially realize 
that he was being contradictory. He seems to have initially thought that he 
could assume the initial endowments of capital goods to have already adapted 
so as to bring about a uniform rate of return on supply price, in spite of their 
treatment as data, i.e. arbitrary givens, of the equilibrium. This is what the 
passage from Walras (1954: 271) quoted above suggests. As shown in the 
Appendix to this paper, this interpretation is also supported by Walras’ 
wholehearted endorsement of an 1890 article by Bortkiewicz. And then there 
is the fact that, up to the third edition, Walras supports the URRSP 
assumption on the basis of the argument that the equality of rates of return on 
the supply prices of the several capital goods will be reached because of two 
reasons: when a higher-than-average rate of return induces an increased 
production of a capital good, the increase in the production of that capital 
good will, first, slightly (‘légèrement’) increase the rentals of the factors 
employed in its production and thus will increase its supply price (‘prix de 
revient’)[13], and second – and this is what interests us here – it will 
appreciably decrease its demand price (‘prix de vente’, Walras 1988: 396, § 
253 of the second edition; also cf. Walras 1954: 594, Jaffé’s collation note [n] 
to §257), a decrease only attributable to a decrease of the rental of that capital 
good, due to an increase in the endowment of the capital good. 
_______________ 
13 With a strange contradiction, Walras writes that this ‘slight’ increase in the 
factor rentals will appreciably (‘sensiblement’) increase the supply price of the 
capital good: he does not seem to realize that if all rentals increase ‘légèrement’, the 
total cost of production increases ‘légèrement’ too. It may also be noticed that the 
increase in the supply price of the capital good will entail a decrease of the rate of 
return on supply price only if the rental of the capital good does not increase even 
more, which requires that the production of the capital good does not utilize the 
services of that same capital good as an input in a higher-than-average proportion – 
a problem for Walras’ argument first pointed out by Garegnani (1962: 14-15), cf. 
Petri (2004: 142, fn. 11).                                                                    .    15     
 
8. Only between the third and the fourth edition of the Eléments Walras 
realized that his previous reasoning was illegitimate. Strikingly, the editors of 
the recent variorum edition of the Eléments (Walras 1988: 812) do not include 
the changes in the theory of capitalization among the important modifications 
introduced in the 4th edition. On the contrary, these changes are extremely 
important because they show that Walras finally reaches a better appreciation 
of the implications of the given capital endowments. The change most 
relevant for our interpretation is the new justification of the tendency toward a 
URRSP, which is now exclusively based on the first of the two reasons 
mentioned in §7: all reference to an influence of an increase in the production 
of a capital good upon its demand price has disappeared (Walras 1954: 292-3; 
1988: 399).  
Thus now the increase in the production of a capital good causes a 
decrease in its rate of return on supply price only because of the increase in its 
cost of production, and no longer also because of the inadmissible increase in 
its endowment. This radical change in the reasoning shows that Walras has 
finally realized that, since he is including the endowments of capital goods 
among the data of the equilibrium, he cannot let them change as part of the 
process bringing equilibrium about. This new awareness and the consequent 
changed justification of the tendency toward a URRSP are what probably 
make him also realize that in fact a uniform rate of return cannot be generally 
reached (Walras 1954: 294, 308; 1988: 401, 430-1), another very important 
novelty of the fourth edition – an admission of radical inconsistency of the 
equations of the model, in fact – neglected by the editors of the 1988 edition. 
 
9. Walras’ new awareness that he cannot let the equilibrating process 
change the endowments of capital goods is also, most probably, the 
explanation of the introduction of the tâtonnement with ‘bons’ in that same 
fourth edition. There is general consensus that up to the third edition the 
tâtonnement is described by Walras as entailing actual disequilibrium 
productions (with the difficulty, unnoticed by Walras, that the endowments of 
capital goods would change during the tâtonnement); there is, on the contrary, 
disagreement on the reasons for the introduction of ‘bons’ in the 4th edition. 
Archival research has been so far unable to discover unpublished notes by 
Walras capable of shedding more light on this issue. One has to rely on his 
published writings, and these suggest that, without the new awareness that the 
equilibrating process must not change the endowments of capital goods, there 
would have been little reason for Walras to change his previous description of 
the tâtonnement of the production and of the capitalistic economy. As                                                                    .    16     
confirmed by the Bortkiewicz article discussed in the Appendix of the present 
paper, by the time of the second edition of the Eléments Walras had 
concluded (and all other marginalist economists would have agreed with him) 
that in the production economy (i.e. in the model where capital goods were 
supposed either non-existent or identical to lands, i.e. eternal and not currently 
produced) he had the right to consider the data of the equilibrium as 
unaffected by the path taken by the tâtonnement (1988: 308; 1954: 590 [f]), 
because the amounts of factors would not be affected, and because the tastes 
of consumers could be assumed given. Thus, in order to be induced later to 
change his description of the tâtonnement, he must have discovered some new 
problem.  
There is no evidence of any such discovery until 1899, when in the 
memoir Equations de la circulation Walras tried to include in the equilibrium 
equations the determination of equilibrium amounts of inventories of 
produced goods too, again on the basis of data including for each consumer 
the ownership of given endowments of all factors, even of inventories[14]. It 
is here that the bons appear for the first time. The high variability of 
inventories must have made it particularly evident to Walras that the 
adjustments toward equilibrium had to be conceived as excluding, not only 
actual exchanges, but also actual productions, which would have altered 
endowments. Thus Walras ended the memoir with a Note where he suggested, 
still very tentatively, that the adjustments “pourraient être supposés fait sur 
bons” (Walras 1899(1993): 581), adding that “Peut-être, au moyen de cette 
hypothèse, distinguera-t-on plus nettement” a first phase of ‘preliminary 
tâtonnements’ from a second phase of actual exchanges and productions of 
the equilibrium quantities and from a third phase of “équilibre dynamique” 
with change in the data and establishment of new equilibrium. Immediately 
afterwards he explicitly stressed that “il doit être bien entendu” (it must be 
clearly understood) that the amounts of newly produced capital goods 
determined by the equilibrium equations only start being utilized in a 
subsequent period, “ne fonctionnent que dans la troisième phase” (ibid., 581-
2) – a warning pointing precisely to the problem arising with his previous 
description of the tâtonnement as entailing actual productions.  
_______________ 
14 “...nous supposons une société établissant cet équilibre ab ovo pour une 
période de temps déterminée, pendant laquelle il n’y aura pas de changements dans 
les données du problème. C’est pourquoi aussi nous dotons nos propriétaires 
fonciers, travailleurs et capitalistes consommateurs de quantités quelconques de 
capitaux circulants et de monnaie, comme nous les avons dotés précédemment de 
quantités quelconques de capitaux fixes: fonciers, personnels et mobiliers” (Walras 
1899(1993): 566). ‘Capitaux circulants’ is Walras’ term for inventories.                                                                    .    17     
In the 4th edition of the Eléments the tentative tone disappears: 
evidently further reflection had shown to Walras that his previous description 
of the tâtonnement was incompatible with the data of his equations, and 
therefore the bons were not simply a way ‘more neatly to distinguish’ the 
equilibrium from the adjustment toward it, but rather were the sole way to 
achieve consistency between the data of equilibrium and the description of the 
adjustment towards it. In this edition Walras reproduces the explicit warning 
that new capital goods only start functioning in a subsequent period (and 
therefore do not alter the equilibrium’s endowments) (§274; Walras 1954: 
319, 1998: 447), and adds to it the observation, when discussing the 
tâtonnement in the theory of capitalization, that the tâtonnement based on 
bons prevents the production of disequilibrium quantities of new capital 
goods (§251; Walras 1954: 282, 1998: 377). 
 
10. This interpretation is more convincing than some alternative ones. 
Bridel and Huck argue that even in the production economy Walras had 
a serious problem with “distributional effects” (redistributions of the 
endowments among individuals), and they attribute the introduction of ‘bons’ 
to the need to preserve “the distributional neutrality of tâtonnement” (Bridel 
and Huck 2002: 521), a need that had already induced Walras in the second 
edition of the Eléments to assume no exchanges at disequilibrium prices in his 
exchange model. They advance two arguments in support of their claim: first, 
in order to determine the selling prices of the given quantities produced at 
each round of the tâtonnement in the production economy, Walras assumes 
given demand functions for the produced goods, while disequilibrium 
transactions would alter them; second, as long as the prices of produced goods 
differ from their costs of production, entrepreneurs make profits or losses and 
this alters their wealth, hence it cannot be assumed that the wealth of each 
individual remains unaltered during the tâtonnement. But the first argument 
founders on Walras’ opinion, expressed in the discussion of the exchange 
economy, that once the quantity of a product to be exchanged or sold on a 
market is given, the market is usually able to find the equilibrium price very 
quickly and that therefore his assumption of no disequilibrium transactions in 
the exchange economy is realistic[15]. As to the second argument, the profits 
_______________ 
15 “The rapidity and reliability of the practical solution leave no room for 
improvement. It is a matter of daily experience that even in big markets where there 
are neither brokers nor auctioneers, the current equilibrium price is determined 
within a few minutes, and considerable quantities of merchandise are exchanged at 
that price within half or three quarters of an hour” (Walras 1954: 106; 1988: 93). No 
analogous appeal to realism could be advanced in the 4th edition for the elimination                                                                    .    18     
and losses of entrepreneurs are no more important than other possible 
redistributions of wealth during the tâtonnement, e.g. due to sales and 
purchases of lands at disequilibrium prices, and Walras, like all other 
marginalist economists, justifiably neglects these changes as of secondary 
importance, indeed, he never mentions them as a possible problem for his 
theory.  
Donzelli (2005) admits that the change in the capital endowments is 
one of the two main difficulties of the tâtonnement of the second and third 
edition, the other one being the possibility that the disequilibrium productions 
assumed to happen in the tâtonnement without ‘bons’ be in fact impossible 
because entailing factor demands different from (I suppose Donzelli means, in 
excess of) factor supplies; and he argues that it is this second difficulty 
“which in the last analysis explains both Walras’ twistings in the first three 
editions of the Eléments and his final change of course in the fourth one” 
(2005: 35, fn. 23). However Donzelli is unable to produce any textual 
evidence that the introduction of ‘bons’ was motivated by this difficulty[16].  
The absence of textual evidence for these interpretations contrasts with 
the explicit admissions by Walras, noticed at the end of §9, that the ‘bons’ 
prevent the production of disequilibrium quantities of new capital goods and 
prevent the tâtonnement from altering that part of the data of the equilibrium 
consisting of the endowments of capital goods. These interpretations also 
suffer from not relying on some new difficulty discovered by Walras between 
the 3rd and the 4th edition. It must be remembered that the tâtonnement of the 
second and third edition is in full accord with Walras’ description, quoted 
earlier (§6), of the adjustments toward equilibrium as “slow” and entailing 
disequilibrium productions, a description that he never retracts. The new 
tâtonnement based on ‘bons’ is hardly reconcilable with that description; it is 
also in contradiction with Walras’ earlier admission, in a letter to Barone 
dated 1895, that the production function is not known a priori to the 
entrepreneur, and must be found out by experimentation (Walker 1987: 771). 
In order to resign himself to a description of the tâtonnement contradicting so 
sharply his views of the actual working of the economy, Walras must have 
___________________________________________________ 
of disequilibrium productions and the neglect of the time required for production.  
16 If, as Donzelli appears to suggest, this difficulty motivated the role of foreign 
markets in the description of the tâtonnement in the production economy in the first 
edition of the Eléments, then the disappearance of the role of foreign markets in the 
second edition must have been due to some reflection on this difficulty, which 
brought Walras to conclude that he could neglect it; so if Donzelli were right, 
Walras should have afterwards changed his mind on this issue, but there is no 
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been motivated by the discovery of some grave new problem. The new 
awareness of the implications of the given endowments of capital goods for 
the tâtonnement and for the tendency to a URRSP stands out as the sole 
plausible candidate I am aware of; no other analogous discovery is revealed 
by the fourth edition of the Eléments. 
 
III. Why the dominance of long-period notions of equilibrium was 
subverted after some decades. 
 
11. The long-period character of Walras’ formalization emerges not 
only in the URRSP assumption but also in several other elements (Petri 2004: 
147). For space reasons I only remember the total neglect of the changes that 
relative prices may undergo over time: e.g. the determination of the value of 
land as equal to the rental divided by the rate of interest, which implies that 
Walras thought that equilibrium prices could be treated as if unchanging for 
very long periods. This confirms that Walras’ conception of equilibrium was a 
long-period one, like that of everybody else at the time; then it is not 
surprising that Walras’ treatment of the capital endowment remained isolated 
among the founders of the marginalist approach: the other founders were 
clearer than Walras on the need to leave the composition of capital to be 
determined endogenously by the equilibrium. What we must now explain is 
why the situation was reversed some decades later. 
The answer lies in the gradual recognition of grave difficulties with the 
conception of the several capital goods as embodiments, crystallizations, 
portions of a single factor 'capital' of variable 'form', which is the conception 
of capital that one finds in the other founders of the marginalist approach, and 
which rendered it possible to formulate long-period general equilibria where 
the endowments of the several capital goods were endogenously 
determined[17].  
This conception of capital was fundamental to the plausibility of 
_______________ 
17 The presence of this conception in the generality of marginalist authors up to 
the 1930s, with the sole exception of Walras and of a few economists more directly 
influenced by him, is universally admitted and I need not dwell on it. (Walras was 
apparently unable to grasp the possibility of such a conception of capital.) 
Nowadays a widespread misunderstanding identifies this conception of ‘capital’ as 
a single factor with the use of aggregate production functions. But the traditional 
long-period equilibria were fully disaggregated general equilibria and nonetheless 
needed the conception of capital as a single factor of variable ‘form’, because they 
left the composition of capital to be determined endogenously by the equilibrium. 
This is made especially clear by Wicksell (1934). Cf. Petri (2004: ch. 3).                                                                    .    20     
marginalist analyses. One can distinguish a supply-side from a demand-side 
role of this conception. Its supply-side role was to make it possible to leave 
the endowments of the several capital goods as variables to be endogenously 
determined by the equilibrium; thus the endowments of the several capital 
goods were not data of the equilibrium: had they been so treated, this would 
have deprived the equilibrium of the persistence required to conceive it as the 
centre of gravitation of day-by-day magnitudes[18]. The persistence of the 
data made it possible to extend to economies with capital the conception 
applicable to economies with only non-produced factors, i.e. the conception 
(adopted by Walras too before the introduction of ‘bons’) of disequilibrium 
processes as taking time and involving the implementation of disequilibrium 
production decisions.  
On the demand side, this conception considered capital as analogous to 
labour or land in the factor substitution mechanisms central to the theory, thus 
permitting the conclusion that the demand for capital was a decreasing 
function of its price, i.e. of the rate of interest. One can usefully distinguish 
two aspects of this demand-side role. First, the postulate that ‘capital’-labour 
substitution worked much like land-labour substitution made it possible to 
assume that the substitution mechanisms worked in the ‘right’ direction; the 
rate of interest could then be viewed as the price bringing into equality the 
supply of and the demand for 'capital', and therefore also the supply of, and 
the demand for, savings or loanable funds. Thus the decreasing demand curve 
for ‘capital’ was the basis for the acceptance of "Say’s Law", i.e. of the 
tendency of investment to adapt to savings rather than vice-versa[19]. The 
_______________ 
18 Persistence does not mean total absence of change; it only means that the 
changes in the data can be taken to be sufficiently slow, relative to the presumable 
speed of tendency toward the equilibrium, as to render the (slowly moving) 
equilibrium position a good indication of the trend of market prices and quantities. 
An example is population changes. Drastic once-for-all changes in the equilibrium’s 
data were of course to be studied via comparative statics.  
19 The discovery of reverse capital deepening undermines this basis. In the 
classical authors who, like Ricardo, accepted Say's Law (i.e. accepted that all 
savings would translate into investment so that 'general gluts' could be excluded), 
the reason was not an equilibrating role attributed to the rate of interest on the basis 
of a decreasing demand curve for capital or for loanable funds (Garegnani 1978). 
The absence of the notion of decreasing demand curves for factors in these authors 
shows up in the fact that Say's Law was not thought to imply the full employment of 
labour, and that unemployment created by labour-saving technical innovations was 
thought to require, in order to be absorbed, capital accumulation, not a change in 
capital-labour proportions at the given stage of accumulation as on the contrary 
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second aspect was that the variable ‘form’ of ‘capital’ made it possible to 
assume a sufficient substitutability between ‘capital’, and labour or land; such 
a sufficient substitutability was impossible to conceive for the single capital 
goods, as openly admitted e.g. by Hicks (1932: 18-21) or Robertson (1931).  
 
12. But this factor 'capital' had to be conceived as a quantity of value, or 
at least a quantity of a substance proportional to value, because in equilibrium 
heterogeneous capital goods receive net rentals proportional to their values 
(their costs of production) and if these rentals are to be seen as reflecting the 
contribution of a common factor ‘capital’ crystallized in them, then 
necessarily the amount of capital embodied in them must be proportional to 
their net rentals and therefore also to their values.   
This conception entails therefore that, whatever substance it is 
conceived as being made of, the 'capital' embodied in different capital goods 
must be proportional to their equilibrium relative values; but then any change 
in distribution, by altering the relative values of commodities, implies a 
change in the relative amounts of 'capital' contained in different capital goods; 
thus the 'quantity of capital' embodied in any given vector of capital goods 
depends on the choice of numéraire and on the prices (and hence on the 
income distribution) assumed to be ruling at the time of measurement; 
therefore the 'capital' endowment of an economy changes as relative prices 
change, even when the capital stock remains unchanged as a physical vector; 
it is therefore impossible to take the endowment of 'capital' of an economy (a 
single number) as given without arbitrariness when relative prices are what 
must be determined. A long-period marginalist general equilibrium is 
accordingly impossible to determine: the datum relative to the endowment of 
'capital' is logically indeterminable. 
 
13. After some decades, this problem started to be admitted by 
marginalist economists. Knut Wicksell, the first economist to attempt the 
writing down of the complete system of equations of a long-period 
disaggregated general equilibrium, grew clearly uneasy with the need for an 
endowment of 'capital' measured as an amount of value; indeed, he wrote: 
"But it would clearly be meaningless – if not altogether inconceivable – to 
maintain that the amount of capital is already fixed before equilibrium 
between production and consumption has been achieved. Whether expressed 
in terms of one or the other, a change in the relative exchange value of two 
commodities would give rise to a change in the value of capital" (Wicksell, 
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"indeterminateness" of the endowment of capital[20]. Therefore it is not 
surprising that, later, his pupil Lindahl openly admitted that the notion of a 
‘quantity of capital’ was indefensible because indeterminable independently 
of relative prices (Lindahl 1939: 316-17). Lindahl turned to the treatment of 
the capital endowment as a a given vector, and formulated in 1929 the notions 
of intertemporal equilibrium (with perfect foresight) and of temporary 
equilibrium. Friedrich Hayek developed a similar rejection of value capital in 
about the same period (Milgate 1982), and he too turned to a vector 
specification of the capital endowment, vigorously criticizing the conception 
of capital as a single factor in a series of articles culminating in Hayek 
(1936)[21]. Around 1935 John Hicks too became unhappy with capital as a 
'fund', under the impact of Shove's harsh objections to his uncritical use of 
that notion in The Theory of Wages (cf. Garegnani 1976), and under the 
influence of Hayek and Lindahl he turned to temporary equilibria. His Value 
and Capital was very influential[22]. Later, one finds for example Friedrich 
Lutz writing: “the subsistence fund, in the sense of a given value magnitude, 
cannot be taken as a datum but is itself one of the unknowns, so that the 
system of these writers [Lutz is referring to Böhm-Bawerk, Wicksell, and 
other ‘Austrian’ authors, F.P.] lacked one equation for determining the 
equilibrium” (Lutz 1967, p. 69). Lutz too concluded by opting for the 
treatment of each capital good as a separate factor with its given endowment. 
 
14. But one also finds in 1963 a treatise on general equilibrium by 
Robert E. Kuenne, which, after discussing Walras in considerable detail, 
concludes that the nature of capital and of the origin of a positive rate of 
interest are best examined in terms of stationary economies, i.e. with an 
endogenously determined composition of capital (only to be then unable to 
_______________ 
20 In spite of this admission, in the immediately following formulation of the 
general equilibrium equations Wicksell takes as given "the total exchange value of 
the capital employed" (1934, p. 204); but he does not explain why he considers such 
a procedure acceptable in spite of what he has just written. 
21 Blaug (1999b: 260-1) argues that the controversy between Knight and Hayek, 
of which Hayek (1936) is part, resulted in “the categorical rejection of any 
operational metric of capital expressed in the dimension of time”, thus suggesting 
that what was rejected was only the Austrian approach to capital. In fact Hayek 
forcefully rejected not only the average period of production but also any 
conception of capital as a single quantity, a ‘fund’, a conception present in J. B. 
Clark, in Knight, and in the Marshallian school as much as in the ‘Austrian’ authors.  
22 Interestingly, Blaug (2002, fn. 3, p. 51) states that "the rot goes back to Hicks 
(1939)", but he does not stop to clarify the roots of the rot in the adoption of a very-
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choose between the different views of Clark, Böhm-Bawerk, Fisher, Knight, 
Wicksell, Metzler – an indirect confirmation of the difficulty of making the 
notion of capital as a single factor logically consistent).  
Anyway Kuenne is able to avoid a given endowment of capital (the 
value magnitude) only because he, like Hicks (1939) before him, mistakenly 
interprets the traditional stationary state assumption as referring to a very-
long-period, or ‘secular’, stationary state, i.e. a state in which accumulation 
has come to an end because the capital endowment has become so large, and 
the interest rate so low, that net savings become zero (the capital endowment 
is then endogenously determined not only in its composition but also in its 
'quantity'): the stationary state assumption of J. B. Clark or Wicksell was on 
the contrary concerned with determining the income distribution of a given 
economy with its given quantity of capital, and only had the purpose to leave 
aside the complications connected with the existence of net savings so as to 
make the reasons for the level of the rate of interest as clear as possible 
(Garegnani 1976; Petri 2004, ch. 4). Thus Wicksell (1934: 204) had been 
crystal-clear on the need to include among the data of a long-period 
equilibrium a given value endowment of capital. But after Hicks’s Value and 
Capital long-period equilibria are more and more confused with steady-
growth (i.e. ‘secular’) equilibria[23]. 
Actually, in the 1940s and 1950s there appears to have been a striking 
loss of familiarity with older marginalist analyses, to the point of no longer 
understanding the long-period nature of the equilibrium that older marginalist 
authors had in mind[24], and often of being content with the general-
equilibrium model of the acapitalistic production-and-exchange economy, as 
if capital did not pose any new analytical problem relative to land-labour 
_______________ 
23 Hicks used this identification of long-period equilibrium with secular 
stationary equilibrium to argue that long-period equilibria were useless because 
unable to deal with real economies, which are not stationary; his argument is refuted 
in Petri (2004: ch. 4). More generally, it is nowadays common to attribute the shift 
to very-short-period equilibria to a supposed applicability, of analyses where 
changes of normal relative prices are neglected, only to steady states. This is a 
misunderstanding that forgets that long-period analyses do not need the strict 
constancy of relative prices through time, but only that endogenous changes in long-
period prices (i.e. in normal costs of production inclusive of the normal rate of 
return) be slow relative to the presumable speed of convergence of market prices to 
costs of production. 
24 As I argue in Petri (2004: Appendix 5A1), persuasive evidence that already by 
the 1940s the loss of familiarity with the older, long-period notion of equilibrium 
was enormous comes from the Patinkin Controversy (or Classical Dichotomy 




IV. The new problems arising with the shift to very-short-period (neo-
Walrasian) general equilibria. 
 
15. It would seem therefore that with the 1930s a period of confusion 
and uncertainty ensued on how to insert capital goods into the supply-and-
demand approach to value and distribution. The more and more widely 
perceived illegitimacy of a value endowment of capital pushed toward the 
adoption of a vector endowment of capital, but, it would seem, with little 
clarity as to the implications of such a shift to very-short-period equilibria. 
The new problems posed by such a shift were left nearly unmentioned.  
It is useful briefly to recall those, of these new problems, more clearly 
responsible for much of the current dissatisfaction with general equilibrium 
theory in its modern formulations (Garegnani 1976, 1990; Petri 1991). 
The  impermanence problem is nowadays widely recognized in one 
form or other (but generally its gravity is not fully appreciated). The 
equilibrium's data relative to the endowments of capital goods are 
insufficiently persistent, so before agents can learn and correct disequilibrium 
mistakes, the equilibrium may have changed considerably, thus affording 
little guide to the behaviour of the economy. (This is the reason for the 
restriction of stability studies to fairy-tale tâtonnements with ‘bons’.) Among 
neoclassical economists, the gravity of this problem has been fully recognized 
almost only by Franklin M. Fisher, who has admitted that the moment one 
accepts that disequilibrium involves actual productions, then disequilibrium 
actions change the economy's endowments, and this “makes the calculation of 
equilibria corresponding to the initial state of the system essentially 
irrelevant” (Fisher 1983: 14). Where realistically conceived disequilibrium 
adjustments will take the economy becomes in fact a totally open question, on 
which modern general equilibrium theory has nothing to say because it is 
silent on what happens when disequilibrium decisions are implemented; it 
gives no reason to presume that the actual path taken by the economy will not 
_______________ 
25 Weintraub and Gayer (2001), although their aim is different, provide evidence 
in support of this statement by showing that between the end of the 1940s and the 
end of the 1950s the main textbooks in value theory used in graduate courses in the 
USA (Sidney Weintraub; Stigler; Henderson and Quandt) only presented the 
acapitalistic general equilibrium model, without discussing how that model could 
accommodate capital goods. Lange (1942), the article at the origin of the Patinkin 
controversy, is also based on an acapitalistic general equilibrium model.                                                                    .    25     
be considerably different from the equilibrium path. The theory’s silence on 
the economy’s behaviour in realistically conceived disequilibrium means that 
modern general equilibrium theory tells us nothing at all as to how actual 
economies behave (Petri 1999: 49-50). Professor Blaug would appear to be 
close to the same conclusion. 
The substitutability problem, less widely recognized nowadays but not 
less important, consists of the fact that alternative productive methods 
generally require different capital goods, not the same capital goods in 
different proportions, so only the conception of capital as a single factor of 
variable 'form' can give plausibility to the assumption of extensive factor 
substitutability; with a Walrasian treatment of the capital endowment the 
absence of substitutability will generate implausibly high numbers of zero 
rentals and a highly inelastic labour demand curve resulting, with high 
likelihood, in implausible levels of the equilibrium real wage (as admitted e.g. 
by Hicks in 1932: 18-21). The substitutability problem further reinforces the 
relevance of the impermanence problem because it also implies that small 
changes in the composition of capital can drastically change many capital 
goods' rentals as well as the equilibrium real wage. 
The price-change problem arises due to the fact that, as already noticed 
(§3), it becomes necessary to take into account the changes that relative prices 
are undergoing. This is done either by assuming the existence of complete 
futures markets and the simultaneous determination of equilibrium on current 
and on subsequent markets (intertemporal equilibria), or by considering 
temporary equilibria with expectation functions among the data. The dilemma 
then arises between the absurd assumption of complete futures markets or 
perfect foresight, and an indefiniteness problem arising in temporary 
equilibria: subjective unobservable expectations render the results of the 
analysis largely arbitrary, depending on unverifiable assumptions about 
expectations and their change over time.  
 
16. The older versions of marginalist theory relying on the conception 
of capital as a single factor of variable ‘form’ did not suffer from these 
problems: the long-period nature of the equilibrium left the composition of 
capital to be determined endogenously, thus avoiding the impermanence 
problem; the variable 'form' of capital avoided the substitutability problem; 
expectations could be assumed to have the time to be corrected by experience 
on average, thus falling out of the data of the problem. (In the case of Walras, 
the overabundance of mathematics obscured the fact that his treatment of the 
capital endowment was incompatible with his declared aim of determining a 
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It should now be clearer why the marginalist approach at its birth could 
not be accused of extreme abstraction or unreal assumptions, and could 
propose itself as a more satisfactory determination of what the theory of value 
and distribution had always attempted, the determination of long-period 
positions[26]. Indeed, when looking for the reasons for its success, it must not 
be forgotten that the marginalist approach became dominant on the basis of 
the (mistaken) faith that it was able to determine long-period equilibria, 
capable of describing the trend of economies realistically conceived as 
continually in disequilibrium[27]. At the end of the 19th century it was nearly 
impossible to believe otherwise: the specialist works on this issue, Walras's 
Eléments in its first three editions (1874-1896), and Wicksell's Uber Wert, 
Kapital und Rente (1893), the sole attempts at the time to treat the problem of 
capital within a general equilibrium setting, had both claimed to have shown 
that the approach was able to determine a long-period equilibrium. Nor was it 
easy to realise, later, that the changes in Walras's 4th edition of his Eléments 
(1900) implied defeat in this respect: Walras did not openly admit it, and to 
the best of my knowledge the thing became clear only with Garegnani (1960). 
As to Wicksell, his rejection in the Lectures (1901-1928) of the average 
period of production and hence of the 1893 analysis, and reticent admission of 
problems with determining the endowment of capital, became available in 
English only in 1934. The writings of Lindahl and Hayek that question capital 
the single factor come out in the same decade. If we consider 1880 as a date 
when the marginalist approach was already very influential, then we must 
conclude that for fifty years at least, the faith in the marginalist approach was 
based on a myth: that it was able satisfactorily to determine long-period 
equilibria. The history of economic theory might easily have taken a different 
turn, if Walras' and Wicksell's admissions of difficulties had happened earlier 
and had become common knowledge before the supply-and-demand approach 
had had the time thoroughly to permeate the economists' minds.  
 
17. It can also be doubted that the approach would have been able to 
impose itself, if it had been presented from the start in versions needing an 
assumption of instantaneous equilibration. The shift to the very-short-period 
_______________ 
26 This term is used to encompass also the natural prices and normal effectual 
demands that classical value theory aimed at determining. 
27 Thus professor Blaug’s identification (particularly clear in Blaug 1999b: 267) 
of what he calls “the end-state conception of competition” with the neo-Walrasian 
notion of equilibrium is misleading: long-period equilibria were end-states too, but 
compatible with time-consuming disequilibria, and the same holds for the classical 
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versions could only be accomplished after decades of total dominance of the 
approach, when it had become so deeply ingrained into the economists' minds 
that its conclusions tended to be taken as obvious aspects of reality (rather 
than as the results of a complex chain of deductions whose validity became 
doubtful once one of its pillars was recognised to be untenable); the 
replacement of long-period equilibria with sequences of very-short-period 
equilibria could then be considered of minor importance, since the faith in the 
tendency toward a situation of full employment, with each factor receiving its 
marginal product, was by then solidly entrenched, and the sequences of very-
short-period equilibria were sequences of full-employment situations, with 
factors receiving their marginal products. 
It seems clear, in fact, that the rejection of the traditional treatment of 
the endowment of capital as a single factor in general equilibrium theory did 
not entail a questioning of the traditional conception of capital as in some 
sense a single factor (whose desired proportion to labour was a decreasing 
function of the interest rate), nor of the conclusions based on such a 
conception. Hayek’s rejection of all conception of capital as a single factor, a 
‘fund’, should have raised doubts on all analyses based on that conception and 
on the associated notion of capital-labour substitution responding to changes 
in income distribution; the question, for example, whether a decrease in the 
rate of interest could be expected to increase the demand for loanable funds – 
a thesis based on an assumed desire by firms to employ more capital per unit 
of labour – should have been reconsidered from scratch, the moment it was 
admitted that capital goods could not be seen as embodiments of a single 
‘fund’ whose quantity was independent of distribution. But at the time that 
conception of capital was so universal, so instilled into the mind from the first 
contact with economics, that it continued to be accepted in fact. For example, 
no one doubted that the long-period demand schedule for labour (the one 
derived from giving time to firms to change the capital goods they employ) 
was a decreasing function of the real wage, indeed, a more elastic function 
than the short-period schedule. Analogously, the negative elasticity of the 
capital-labour proportion (and thus of aggregate investment) vis-à-vis the real 
interest rate was not doubted. Borrowing a term from Garegnani (2000: 443), 
the shift to very-short-period equilibria was essentially a cosmetic operation; 
the working of the economy was still believed to be the one emerging from 
the older marginalist analyses relying on capital the single factor of variable 
‘form’. 
A striking confirmation is provided by Hicks who, after advocating 
with Value and Capital the temporary equilibrium method as a way to avoid 
the conception of capital as a single factor (a 'fund'), later had second thoughts                                                                    .    28     
and admitted grave problems in the temporary equilibrium method, but was 
not induced by this to doubt the entire supply-and-demand approach and on 
the contrary reaffirmed in 1963 his faith in the possibility of conceiving 
capital as a single quantity in some physical sense (Hicks 1932: 345; cf. Petri 
1991), although never daring to go back to treating capital as a single factor K 
in his formal analyses. Professor Blaug brings further confirmation to this 
thesis when in (1999b: 261) he mentions the survival in Hayek’s Pure Theory 
of Capital of an inverse relationship between rate of interest and capital 
intensity of production processes, and then in the same place (ibid., fn. 6) he 
quotes Hayek as declaring in a 1945 interview that “Böhm-Bawerk was 
fundamentally right”. And the generality of marginalist authors in those years 
shows, for example with the development of the theory of international trade, 
and later with the Tobin-Solow-Swan theory of growth, that the conclusions 
based on treating capital as a single factor were still believed to be valid. 
However in the ‘rigorous’ presentations of the theory of value and 
distribution, i.e. in the theory of general equilibrium, there could be no going 
back to an endowment of capital as a single factor, an amount of value: after 
Hayek's (1936) forceful attacks against such a procedure, the inconsistency 
was too blatant. It was inevitable, if the approach was not to be entirely 
abandoned, to turn to the Walras-Lindahl-Hayek-Hicks treatment of the 
capital endowment as a given vector.  
 
V. The rise to dominance of the Arrow-Debreu model 
 
18. The observations of the previous Sections yield the essential 
premise for an explanation of the rise to dominance of the Arrow-Debreu 
model.  
This model was a reformulation of the Wald model, in turn a 
generalization of the so-called Walras-Cassel model of an acapitalistic 
production-and-exchange  general equilibrium. This helps one explain the 
initial unproblematic reception of the model: given the traditional ‘three-
stage’ presentation of the marginalist theory of value (pure exchange; 
exchange and production; introduction of capital), the study of pure-exchange 
models and of acapitalistic general equilibrium models was considered 
legitimate and important as first steps toward the complete theory, and 
therefore an acceptance of the intertemporal, very-short-period equilibrium, 
reinterpretation of the Arrow-Debreu model was not necessary in order to 
appreciate the feat of the authors, and probably it was not initially widespread 
(on this, more research would be necessary).  
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intertemporal reinterpretation of the model, with its necessary assumption of 
complete futures markets or perfect foresight, and with its very-short-period 
nature that obliged stability studies to assume the fairy-tale tâtonnement based 
on ‘bons’[28]. 
The answer here is that the neoclassical approach could not remain 
without a theory of value capable of including capital goods. Long-period 
equilibria, with their need for a value endowment of capital, could no longer 
be defended; the void had to be filled somehow. The sole other possible 
treatment of the capital endowment compatible with a supply-and-demand 
approach was to treat each capital good as a separate factor with a given 
endowment[29]. This might have meant temporary equilibria, but their 
rigorous formalization needed a treatment of expectations, with complications 
that only many years later it was found possible to examine analytically 
(serious difficulties then emerged in the formalization of the equilibrium and 
in the demonstration of existence; I suggest that these difficulties, together 
with the indefiniteness problem, explain why temporary equilibria have never 
supplanted the Arrow-Debreu model as the foundation of neoclassical value 
theory). The notion of intertemporal equilibrium had already been proposed 
by Lindahl and Hayek; its formalization as simply a re-interpretation of the 
acapitalistic model had the great advantage of familiarity. The a-priori faith, 
discussed in §17, in the correctness of the traditional marginalist theses 
rendered the debatable aspects of the model (e.g. the finite horizon) less 
relevant: the model could be seen as a first approximation, whose implausible 
aspects would be removed by the further progress of analysis, and in the 
meanwhile it yielded the results that one believed to be correct anyway: full 
employment, each factor receiving its marginal product, the first welfare 
theorem, etcetera.  
_______________ 
28 The equilibrium of the exchange-and-production model with only 
nonproduced factors could on the contrary be interpreted as a long-period 
equilibrium, reached by time-consuming adjustments, because its data could be 
treated as unchanged by disequilibrium actions, cf. §9.  
29 We have here the reason for what Blaug describes as “the curious trade-off that 
seems to prevail between existence proofs and stability proofs in GE theory” (Blaug 
2002b: 25). In order to formulate a system of equilibrium equations admitting 
capital goods but not including among its data a value endowment of capital, it was 
necessary to adopt the Walrasian treatment of the capital endowment, which 
precludes the consideration of realistic disequilibrium adjustments. No such ‘trade-
off’ would arise in a long-period GE model, e.g. Wicksell’s model, if one accepted 
to take the capital endowment as given as an amount of value (existence of 
equilibrium would be demonstrable for such a model as easily as for neo-Walrasian 
GE models).                                                                     .    30     
 
19. Another aspect that must have contributed to the acceptance of the 
intertemporal interpretation of the Arrow-Debreu model is the confused state 
of capital theory at the time, in particular the little familiarity with previous 
attempts at including capital goods into the supply-and-demand approach. It 
has been noticed above that for many economists in those years general 
equilibrium theory, i.e. the rigorous presentation of value and distribution 
theory, appears to have consisted of the acapitalistic general equilibrium 
model only; the presence of a third ‘stage’, a specific treatment of capitalistic 
production in earlier authors, e.g. in Walras or in Wicksell, was largely 
forgotten. To those economists, the intertemporal reinterpretation of the 
acapitalistic model must have appeared a novel and interesting extension, 
finally permitting an inclusion of capital goods into general equilibrium 
theory.  
One wonders whether at the time this was not the case also with Arrow 
and Debreu. When they propose the reinterpretation of their model as an 
intertemporal model, they do not accompany the proposal with any comment 
on the previous attempts to include time and capital into general equilibrium 
theory. It is indeed striking that, as far as I know, no author of the Cowles 
Commission group (the group, including Arrow, Debreu, Koopmans, Gale, 
Hurwicz, and others, out of which came the Arrow-Debreu model) felt any 
need to discuss why the approach to capital of Walras or of Wicksell was 
inferior to the one they were proposing.  
However one must not think that the rise to dominance of the Arrow-
Debreu intertemporal model was quick. Here too more research is needed, but 
some observations can already be advanced. We have noticed above that 
international trade theory and growth theory show the persistence in the 1950s 
of the faith in the legitimacy of the treatment of capital as a single factor at 
least in applied analyses. I have also mentioned Kuenne (1963); later still, the 
survey of general equilibrium models by Bent Hansen (1970) presents a series 
of 'Austrian' general equilibrium models, and one of them (in ch. 17) is based 
on a given value endowment of capital. It would seem then that at least in the 
1950s and early 1960s the Arrow-Debreu model was far from having won the 
field as the foundation of neoclassical value and distribution theory.  
In this situation of uncertainty and lack of clarity, the decisive push 
most probably came from the Cambridge debates on capital theory; the 
impossibility of a measurement of aggregate capital in units independent of 
income distribution was again and again repeated in that debate, and accepted 
also by the neoclassical side; the results on reswitching permitted a logically 
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compelled neoclassical economists to claim that their theory did not need the 
conception of capital as a single factor, and to turn exclusively to the very-
short-period versions as the foundation of their approach, as admitted e.g. by 
Christopher Dougherty: “Since then [the mid-1960s] the general equilibrium 
model has been the undisputed core of neoclassical capital theory” 
(Dougherty, 1980: 3). 
 
20. So, why did the Arrow-Debreu paper become a model of 
scientificity? why wasn't the unreality of the model, when interpreted so as to 
encompass production with capital goods, and therefore as an intertemporal 
equilibrium suffering from the implausible assumption of complete futures 
markets and from the incompatibility with time-consuming disequilibrium 
adjustments, soon met with destructive criticism?[30] The basic answer I have 
suggested is: because the root cause of the lack of realism, the neo-Walrasian 
treatment of the capital endowment, was the sole way to remain within a 
supply-and-demand approach to value and distribution once the treatment of 
the capital endowment as an amount of value was recognized as untenable. In 
order not to abandon the supply-and-demand approach, value theorists had to 
convince themselves that the basis of the approach could be shifted to very-
short-period equilibria and sequences of such equilibria, in spite of the new 
difficulties thus emerging such as the impermanence problem and the price-
change problem. The survival, more or less explicit, of the faith in the 
adjustment mechanisms based on the traditional conception of capital as a 
_______________ 
30 That the mathematical feat deserved some praise cannot be doubted; that the aim 
was worthwile cannot be doubted either (if it had been shown that equilibrium generally 
does not exist for the acapitalistic economy, this would have been very important); what 
requires explanation is why this praise was not so much watered down by recognition of 
the unreality of the model when interpreted so as to make room for capital goods, as to 
bring a majority of readers to the conclusion that the mathematical effort was inconclusive 
because only applicable to the acapitalistic model. Thus the problem with GE theory is not 
correctly characterized as one of excessive rigour, as Blaug appears to suggest in several 
places (1999b: 272; 2002b: 27) and very clearly already in (1992: 167): “Alas, there is a 
trade-off in economics (and not only in economics) between rigor and relevance”. The 
problem would rather seem to be one of insufficient rigour, because theoretical (as 
distinguished from mathematical) rigour is exercised in finding out to which world the 
equations can possibly apply, but not in asking what the roots are of the patent unreality of 
the resulting world, nor in asking - on the basis of this result - whether the equations do 
satisfy the question originally motivating them: the characterization of the situation toward 
which the interplay of supply and demand realistically conceived is believed to push the 
economy. It is a poor conception of rigour, that only requires that consequences be 
correctly drawn from a model, and not also that the model’s structure be well justified in 
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single factor made this shift easier, because it was believed to make little 
difference.  
It took decades for the sterility due to the impossibility to study 
adjustment problems in more realistic ways to start raising deeper doubts. The 
Cambridge controversies no doubt had an important role, by pointing out in 
irrefutable terms the indefensibility of the traditional conception of capital-
labour substitution: this made it harder for neoclassical value and distribution 
theory to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds by claiming that GE 
theory did away completely with any notion of capital as a single factor, while 
at the same time claiming GE theory as the foundation for theses originally 
derived and only derivable from that notion of capital[31]. Since then, general 
equilibrium theorists have more and more often had to admit that GE theory, 
owing to the unrealistic assumptions needed in order to assume that market 
economies reach an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, does not give support to the 
neoclassical theories that dominate macroeconomics, international trade, 
etcetera.  
 
VI. Back to Marshall? 
 
21. The important implication of the argument advanced in this paper 
concerns how to surmount the sterility of modern general equilibrium theory 
and make room for the more realistic conception of competition that professor 
Blaug rightly considers essential to an understanding of concrete economies.  
Once again we can rely on professor Blaug, who implicitly indicates 
the way when he accuses modern GE theory of preventing  
 
consideration of all dimensions of competitive rivalry other than price, such 
as availability, quality of product, quality of delivery, quantity and quality 
of information about the product, etc.; in short, all aspects of non-price 
competition because those take place sequentially in real time. This is 
precisely what competition meant to Smith, Ricardo and Marx and, even 
after Cournot, this is what it meant to Marshall. (Blaug 1999b: 266) 
 
The obvious suggestion emerging from this quote is that one should 
return to the way of approaching the study of market economies of Smith, 
Ricardo, Marx, and Marshall. What these authors had in common was the 
_______________ 
31 Petri (2004: chs. 7, 8) shows that such is indeed the case for the negative 
elasticity of aggregate investment vis-à-vis the rate of interest, and for the negative 
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method we have called ‘of long-period positions’, based on the distinction 
between market prices and quantities, and normal (or long-period) prices and 
quantities: a method that permits the consideration of phenomena taking place 
“sequentially in real time”. Clearly, we should recuperate that method. 
But, among these authors, Marshall presents a problem. The analysis of 
this paper shows that we cannot go back to notions of ‘centres of gravitation’ 
of market prices and quantities, while retaining the marginalist, or supply-
and-demand, approach to value and distribution. It was precisely the decision 
not to abandon that approach in the face of its inability to determine 
sufficiently persistent ‘centres of gravitation’, that prompted the shift to neo-
Walrasian general equilibrium theory. The root of the problem is the supply-
and-demand approach to distribution itself, which comes out to be unable 
satisfactorily to treat capital. Both possible treatments of the capital 
endowment in this approach run against insurmountable difficulties (Petri, 
1991): the long-period treatment needs an indeterminable endowment of a 
quantity of value; the very-short-period treatment runs into the three 
methodological problems illustrated above, and in addition, if the traditional 
conception of capital is truly abandoned (as rendered inevitable by the 
discovery of reswitching and reverse capital deepening), no basis is left for 
the thesis that investment adjusts to savings, nor for the decreasing labour 
demand schedule (Petri 2004: chs. 7 and 8). 
Thus, the ‘back to Marshall’ appeal, implicit in much of the literature 
that deplores the excessive formalism and lack of realism of modern 
neoclassical value theory[32], can only be accepted in so far as it means ‘back 
to realistic analyses that admit time-consuming adjustments’; but on issues 
such as, what determines income distribution or the level of employment, 
Marshall was fundamentally a marginalist theorist and his analyses, in so far 
as they rely on the marginalist approach, cannot be resumed. 
Fortunately there remain Smith, Ricardo and Marx. The weaknesses of 
the classical determination of relative prices (the shortcomings of the labour 
theory of value) have been overcome by the modern developments of the 
theory of long-period prices (prices of production). As argued in Petri (2004: 
ch. 9), the resumption of the classical approach and its union with a 
Keynesianism freed of neoclassical elements allows not only a full 
recuperation of the traditional and fruitful method of long-period positions, 
but also a better reconciliation of economic theory with a number of 
phenomena that the supply-and-demand approach has always found it 
difficult to explain, for example persistent unemployment (e.g. Europe since 
_______________ 
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1975), persistent underutilization of capacity (e.g. Japan since 1990), or the 
insensitivity of investment to the rate of interest. The greater role given in the 
classical approach to institutions, to political and sociological elements, and to 
historical specificities can also help correct the excessive importance given to-
day to mathematical competence vis-à-vis knowledge of how real economies 
actually function, another point on which it is difficult to disagree with 
professor Blaug.  
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APPENDIX - WALRAS AND BORTKIEWICZ 
 
This Appendix points out that the interpretation advanced in §7 of Walras’ views on 
capital before the 4th edition is supported by a so far neglected evidence. In 
September 1889 Edgeworth published in the English journal Nature a review of the 
second edition of Walras’ Eléments, where, after an initial praise of Walras as co-
discoverer of the role of marginal utility, he harshly criticized several aspects of 
Walras’ work. Walras did not reply directly, but immediately set to persuade the 
young Ladislaus Bortkiewicz to write a reply. I rely on Marchionatti (2003) for the 
following useful information:  
 
In early December Walras received Bortkievicz’s paper and was very 
satisfied of it: ‘I found a man capable of reading me attentively and 
understanding me perfectly, and capable of defending my point of view as 
well as I can, if not better’ (‘J’ai trouvé un homme capable de me lire 
attentivement, de me comprendre parfaitement et de défendre mon point de 
vue aussi bien, sinon mieux, que je pourrais le faire moi-même’) (letter of 8 
December 1889). He sent it (with a few changes) to Gide, the editor of the 
Revue d’économie politique. He wrote: ‘I am sending you an excellent 
paper that offers an exact idea of my work in the form of a rejoinder 
(incontestable, according to me) to Edgeworth’s criticism’ (‘Je vous envoie 
sous ce pli séparé un article excellent qui, sous forme d’une réponse (tout à 
fait irréfutable, selon moi) aux critiques d’Edgeworth, donne une idée 
parfaitement exacte de mon ouvrage’) (26 December). Bortkievicz’s paper 
was published at the beginning of 1890. On 20 February 1890, Walras 
wrote proudly to Edgeworth: ‘This is the answer to your critiques’ (‘Voici 
la réponse à vos critiques’). (Marchionatti 2003: 4) 
 
Now, Bortkiewicz’s 1890 article (actually signed Bortkévitch) contains the 
following passage on p. 84-85, whose relevance for the interpretation of Walras’ 
views on capital before the 4th edition appears to have escaped attention so far: 
  
“M. Edgeworth ne distingue pas nettement le marché des produits du 
marché des services ou, ce qui revient au même, l’équilibre de l’échange de 
l’équilibre de la production. Ce n’est pas le moindre mérite de M. Walras 
d’avoir insisté sur cette distinction importante. 
Mais M. Edgeworth ne distingue pas mieux l’équilibre de la 
capitalisation de celui de la production qu’il ne distingue l’équilibre de la 
production de celui de l’échange. Il croit qu’il ne sert à rien de traiter 
spécialement le problème de l’utilité maxima des capitaux neufs, vu que, 
«le prix du capital étant déterminé par concurrence, il résulte de la théorie 
générale de l’offre et de la demande que l’utilité maxima  de toutes les 
parties intéressées se réalise dans le même sens que dans les autres 
marchés» (p. 435, col. 1 et 2). On peut objecter au critique anglais : 1
0 que 
le concept de l’utilité des capitaux n’est pas le même que celui de l’utilité                                                                    .    36     
des produits consommables, l’utilité des capitaux étant en quelque sorte 
dérivée de celle des revenus auxquels les capitaux donnent naissance; 2
0 
que la théorie de la capitalisation s’occupe du problème relatif aux 
quantités fabriquées des capitaux neufs, tandis que ces mêmes 
quantités sont considérées comme données dans la théorie de la 
production. Voilà donc un troisième problème tout nouveau qui ne saurait 
être traité comme un cas particulier d’aucun des problèmes résolus dans les 
chapitres précédents du livre de M. Walras. Il devient évident que M. 
Edgeworth n’a pas du tout saisi la corrélation existante entre les trois parties 
du système des Éléments d'économie politique pure -- Dans la théorie de 
l’échange, il s’agit de déterminer les prix des produits, étant données les 
quantités fabriquées de ces produits. -- Dans la théorie de la production, 
ces quantités de produits figurent à titre d’inconnues qui se déduisent 
des quantités données de capitaux fonciers, personnels et mobiliers. 
Quant aux premiers (les terres), leurs quantités sont toujours des donnees du 
problème et non des inconnues. Les facultés personnelles des hommes ne 
dépendent pas non plus du mouvement de la production industrielle, mais 
de celui de la population (Éléments,  p. 266). -- Restent les capitaux 
mobiliers (artificiels), ou capitaux proprements dits, dont les quantités 
peuvent être considérées comme des inconnues; il s’agit de démontrer 
comment elles [p.85] se déterminent, et c’est là l’objet propre de la 
théorie de la capitalisation.” 
The sentences that I have highlighted in bold strongly suggest that, according to 
Bortkiewicz, Walras’ theory of capitalization aims at determining the quantities in 
existence, i.e. the endowments, of capital goods: “Dans la théorie de la production”, 
in the theory of production, Bortkiewicz writes, the quantities of capital goods 
(capitaux mobiliers) are “given quantities” (quantités données) on a par with the 
quantities of lands and of labours, while “the proper object of the theory of 
capitalization” is to show how these quantities of capital goods, which now “can be 
considered as unknowns”, are determined. The same identification (cf. “ces mêmes 
quantités”) of the quantities produced of new capital goods with the endowments of 
capital goods occurs in the sentence following “2°” halfway through the quotation. 
Thus, Bortkiewicz writes as if the determination of the quantities produced of new 
capital goods amounted to also determining their endowments. Now, we have seen 
that Walras wrote (and there is no reason to think that he was lying) that 
Bortkiewicz’ article offered “a perfectly exact idea of my work”. 
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